The formation of living and non-living superordinate concepts as a function of individual differences by Kalénine, Solène & Bonthoux, Françoise
The formation of living and non-living superordinate
concepts as a function of individual differences
Sole`ne Kale´nine, Franc¸oise Bonthoux
To cite this version:
Sole`ne Kale´nine, Franc¸oise Bonthoux. The formation of living and non-living superordinate
concepts as a function of individual differences. Current Psychology Letters/Behaviour, Brain
and Cognition, de Boeck Universite´, 2006, 19 (2), pp.ISSN :1379-6100. <hal-00164350>
HAL Id: hal-00164350
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00164350
Submitted on 20 Jul 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1 
 
 
 
 
The formation of living and non-living superordinate concepts as a function of 
individual differences. 
 
 
 
Solène Kalénine and Françoise Bonthoux 
 
 
Laboratoire de Psychologie et NeuroCognition, CNRS UMR 5105, Université Pierre Mendès 
France, PO Box 47, F-38040 Grenoble Cedex 9. 
 
 
 
Running title: Living and non-living concepts at 3 years 
 
Key words: living and non-living concepts, development, individual differences 
 
 
 
 
This research was supported by grants from the University Pierre Mendes France of Grenoble and the Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique, Authors thank the preschoolers and their teachers who participated in 
these studies. They also thank Diane Poulin-Dubois and Marie-Josèphe Tainturier for helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
Requests for reprints should be addressed to Solène Kalénine, Laboratoire de Psychologie et NeuroCognition, 
CNRS UMR 5105, Université Pierre Mendès France, PO Box 47, F-38040 Grenoble Cedex 9. E-mail: 
solene.kalenine@upmf-grenoble.fr 
 2 
Abstract 
A differential approach of concepts formation considers that concepts can derive from 
similarity and contextual relations, their involvement varying according to individuals and 
domains. The following experiment was designed to test this differential hypothesis. Session 
1 investigated individual differences in 3 year-old children with a matching task contrasting a 
thematic match and a basic-level taxonomic match. In spite of a taxonomic bias, children’s 
sensitivity to each relation ordered on a taxonomic-thematic continuum. In session 2, 
taxonomic performances in superordinate categorization were analyzed as a function of 
children’s sensitivity and objects domain. Children most sensitive to basic level taxonomic 
relations categorized better living things than non-living things at the superordinate level. On 
the contrary, no difference between domains was observed for children most sensitive to 
thematic relations. Moreover, superordinate performances for living things appeared 
correlated to choices in session 1, unlike for non-living things. Overall, results supported a 
differential approach of conceptual development.  
 
Résumé 
Une approche différentielle de la formation des concepts permet envisage que ceux-ci 
dérivent des relations de similarité et de proximité contextuelle entre les objets, leur 
implication variant selon les individus et le domaine. Pour tester cette hypothèse, une tâche 
d’appariement opposant un associé thématique et un associé taxonomique de niveau de base a 
d’abord été proposée à des enfants de 3 ans. Malgré un biais taxonomique, les choix 
s’ordonnent sur un continuum thématique - taxonomique. Dans une seconde phase, les 
performances en catégorisation surordonnée sont analysées selon la sensibilité à chaque 
relation en phase 1 et le domaine. Les enfants les plus sensibles aux relations taxonomiques 
montrent un avantage pour le vivant mais les scores des enfants les plus sensibles aux 
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relations thématiques ne diffèrent pas selon le domaine. En outre pour le vivant, les 
performances surordonnées sont corrélées avec les choix en phase 1 ; aucun lien n’est observé 
pour le non-vivant. Dans l’ensemble, ces résultats appuient un modèle différentiel du 
développement conceptuel.  
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Introduction 
Individual differences in the way children prefer categorizing objects have rarely been 
studied per se. Nevertheless, there are some indirect empirical evidence in this issue. Bauer & 
Mandler (1979) found that very young children (16-19 month-old) can match objects either 
taxonomically or thematically following a brief training phase. A study conducted by 
Waxman & Namy (1997) also revealed that 2-to 4-year-old children can understand both 
taxonomic and thematic relations and appear to adjust their responses according to the 
demands of the task. More relevant to this issue is the work of Dunham & Dunham (1995). In 
experiment 1, three-year-old children were presented with a standard picture (e.g., a dog) and 
3 matching pictures including a basic-level taxonomic match (e.g., another dog), a thematic 
match (e.g., a bone) and a foil (e. g., a pen). The child had to “find another one the same as” 
the standard picture. Results indicated that whereas most children showed a basic-level 
taxonomic tendency, some children exhibited a thematic tendency. These findings clearly 
demonstrate that young children’s categorical choices depend on individual sensitivity to each 
type of relation, these tendencies being relatively stable over time. In addition, a longitudinal 
study (Dunham & Dunham, 1995, experiment 3) showed that a selective interest in relations 
among objects as indexed by early functional-relational play at one year and the use of 
relational terms at two years were both antecedents of the thematic tendency at 3 years. 
Alternatively, a selective interest in objects’ identity as indexed by pointing gestures at one 
year and the use of nouns and adjectives at two years were both antecedents of the basic-level 
taxonomic tendency at 3 years. Thus, individual tendencies in children’s categorization can be 
predicted by several aspects of children’s sensorimotor and linguistic behavior in the first two 
years of life. 
Moreover, children’s categorization seems to depend on situations. Numerous studies 
have revealed task-effects (Blaye, Bernard-Peyron, & Bonthoux, 2000; Markman, Cox, & 
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Machida, 1981), verbal labels (Gelman & Markman, 1987; Gentner & Namy, 1999; 
Golinkoff, Shuff-Bailey, Olguin, & Ruan, 1995; Liu, Golinkoff, & Sak, 2001; Markman & 
Hutchinson, 1984; Waxman & Gelman, 1986), instructions (Osborne & Calhoun, 1998; 
Waxman & Namy, 1997) and training (Deak & Bauer, 1995; Smiley & Brown, 1979). 
Altogether, results suggest inter- and intra-individual variability in categorization behaviors. 
An assumption made by Wisniewski & Bassok (1999) is that different processes underlie 
taxonomic and thematic relations: The variability observed in categorization behaviors might 
be linked with differences in object processing. Using similarity and thematic judgments in 
adults, Wisniewski & Bassok (1999)  revealed that basic-level taxonomic relations 
predominantly activate a comparison process between objects whereas thematic relations 
mainly activate an integration process. Indeed, taxonomically related objects (e.g., poodle-
German shepherd) share many dimensions on which they can be compared (e.g., name, size, 
shape, parts). Within the taxonomic hierarchy, basic-level categories that possess many 
common and distinctive features (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976) 
might lead individuals to predominantly compare items. On the contrary, thematically related 
objects (e.g., apples-basket) are more likely to be integrated into a joint theme or scenario (put 
apples in a basket). Nevertheless, Wisniewski & Bassok (1999)’s results also showed that 
comparison was sometimes used for thematic relations and integration with taxonomic 
relations. 
Indeed, conceptual development might rest at least on two processes, their relative 
implication varying according to individuals and situations (Lautrey, 1990, 2003; Lautrey & 
Caroff, 1997). The role of variability in cognitive development is also a cornerstone of the 
differential approach of Siegler (Siegler & Jenkins, 1989; Siegler & Shipley, 1995) who 
claims that cognitive development is not a 1: 1 correspondence between children’s age and 
the strategy they use to resolve a task. On the contrary, children of a given age range use a 
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variety of strategies, the selection of a particular strategy depending on the children’s 
preferences, their own experience, the effectiveness of each strategy and the problem 
considered. This selection mechanism is assumed to generate cognitive development by 
leading to greater use of processes that have been useful under the particular circumstances 
encountered by the child.  
As concerns concept formation, this approach would imply that at any age, both 
processes (comparison/integration) and relations (basic-level taxonomic/thematic) are 
available. Children can predominantly use either a comparison process and mainly rely on 
basic-level taxonomic relations or an integration process and mainly rely on thematic 
relations, depending on their individual tendencies and the situations. Moreover, different 
kinds of relations might be more or less available as a function of the semantic domain. This 
assumption is based on another range of researches in the domain of language and semantic 
memory. Indeed, data from studies with brain-damaged patients (Capitani, Laiacona, Mahon, 
& Caramazza, 2003) and with normal adults (Cree & McRae, 2003; Devlin, Gonnerman, 
Andersen, & Seidenberg, 1998; Farah & McClelland, 1991; Garrard, Lambon Ralph, Hodges, 
& Patterson, 2001; Laws, Humber, Ramsey, & McCarthy, 1995; Sartori & Job, 1988), suggest 
that perceptual information is more central for the understanding of living things whereas 
contextual and functional information is more central for non-living things. This distinction 
observed in tasks such as property verification or property generation in adults is likely to 
result from the frequency and the way people interact with different kinds of objects. 
However, few results are available in children. Hughes, Woodcock, & Funnell (2005) asked 
“what is a ___?” questions to children aged from 3 to 7 years. Results showed that perceptual 
properties dominate responses to living things when compared with functional properties 
(defined as “the purpose of objects”) whereas functional properties outnumbered perceptual 
responses for non-living things. Moreover, some categorization studies in children have 
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highlighted the greater weight of functional properties for artifacts and perceptual properties 
for living things (Boyer, Bedoin, & Honore, 2000; Hughes et al., 2005; Kemler Nelson, 1995; 
Kemler Nelson, Chan Egan, & Holt, 2004; Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris, & Blair, 
2000; Kemler Nelson, Russell, & Jones, 2000; Scheuner & Bonthoux, 2004), even if both 
information are commonly recruited. Consequently, these findings suggest that comparison of 
several entities along perceptual properties might be predominantly used to form 
superordinate categories of living things. On the other hand, the integration of contextually 
linked artifacts might facilitate the formation of superordinate non-living categories. 
Furthermore, the use of perceptual cues to discriminate and categorize objects seems to 
precede infants’ resorting to functional cues (Madole, Oakes, & Cohen, 1993). These data 
support the interpretation of an earlier structuration of the living domain (Boyer et al., 2000; 
Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998). Thus, we predicted that individual 
tendencies and domains would both influence children’s categorization behavior (Bonthoux, 
2001; Bonthoux, Scheuner, & Roll, 2003).  
The present study aims at testing this hypothesis in 3-year-old children. Three-year-
olds were selected in order to replicate Dunham and Dunham (1995)’s findings, namely 
individual differences in categorization behaviors observed in a matching task contrasting 
basic-level taxonomic and thematic relations.  In a first session, individual sensitivity to basic 
level taxonomic relations versus thematic relations was investigated in a matching task. 
Taxonomic choices were expected to dominate since the taxonomic relation proposed was at 
the basic level. However, we predicted individual differences in children’s categorization 
behavior at this age, as found by Dunham & Dunham (1995) with a similar task. In a second 
session, the understanding of superordinate concepts such as animals or tools was assessed. 
Performances were expected to vary as a function of children’s individual sensitivity and 
concept domains. Specifically, children most sensitive to basic-level taxonomic relations in 
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session 1 should perform better when matching living things than non-living things at the 
superordinate level in session 2. On the contrary, a greater sensitivity to thematic relations 
should facilitate the categorization of non-living things. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty children aged between 3 and 4 years (mean age: 3 years 6 months in the first session) 
took part in this study. Twenty-seven were boys and thirty-three were girls. All were 
attending preschool for the first year. A further 24 children of the same age range and 20 
adults were recruited for pretests. 
Materials and Procedure 
Stimuli 6.5 x 8 centimeters black-and-white drawings selected from a pretest were 
used to construct two match-to-sample tasks.  
Pretest 
A pretest was first conducted to select associations that 3-year-old children usually 
know. This ensured that children’s choices would not be due to the failure to recognize the 
link between the target(s) and one or several alternatives. During pretest, each potential target 
was presented with 3 pictures, one taxonomically or thematically associated to the target and 
two that were not linked to the target (181 associations in all). Children were told for each 
trial to choose between the 3 choices “the one that goes with” the target. Only associations 
that received more than 75% correct responses were selected as possible items of the two 
matching tasks. 
Session 1 
The aim of the first session was to assess children’s individual differences with a 
basic-level matching task comprising 20 trials. Each trial involved 4 pictures: a target picture 
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(e.g., a dog) and 3 matching pictures including a basic-level taxonomic match (e.g., another 
dog), a thematic match (e.g. a bone) and a foil (e.g., a cactus; see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1 : Example of an item in session 1 including a target picture, a thematic match, a basic-level 
taxonomic match and a foil. 
 
Target pictures represented exemplars of various categories from the living and non-
living domains (see Appendix 1). Ten targets were living things and ten were non-living 
things. For each of the 20 trials, children were told to choose among the 3 matching pictures 
the one that “goes best with” the target. Two choices were appropriate: the basic-level 
taxonomic alternative and the thematic alternative. The duration of session 1 was 
approximately 5-10 minutes. 
 Session 2 
The second session took place about one month later (M = 26 days; SD = 6). It was 
designed to examine children’s superordinate categorization as a function of the domain of the 
items and the sensitivity of the children for basic-level taxonomic versus thematic relations as 
determined in session 1. The materials and instructions for this session were selected to favor 
superordinate taxonomic choices. Concerning the materials, Gentner and Namy (Gentner & 
Namy, 1999; Namy & Gentner, 2002) have already shown that engaging children in active 
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comparison of multiple instances of an object category by introducing more than one target 
picture enables them to form conceptual abstractions (see also Liu et al., 2001). Thus, each of 
the 18 trials of the superordinate matching task involved 5 cards: two target cards 
taxonomically linked at the superordinate level (e.g., two fruit: an apple and a banana) and 3 
choice cards: a superordinate taxonomic match (e.g., grapes), a thematic match (e.g., a basket) 
and a foil (e.g., a plug; see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2 : Example of an item in session 2 including a pair of target pictures, a superordinate taxonomic 
match, a thematic match and a foil. 
 
As in the basic-level task, target pictures represented exemplars of various categories, 
9 from the living domain and 9 from the non-living domain (see Appendix 2). In both tasks, 
the position of the 3 matching cards was counterbalanced across trials and the proportion of 
living and non-living foils was equivalent for living and non-living target pictures. The order 
of presentation of the trials was randomly determined. The task was introduced as a card 
game. The experimenter put the two target cards on the table and explained that she had put 
these two cards together because “they are the same kind of things, they belong to the same 
family”. Then the 3 matching cards were presented and the child had to “find the other one of 
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the same kind, of the same family” to complete the pair. The duration of session 2 was 
approximately 10-15 minutes. The task was administered to ten adults who, as expected, 
performed almost at ceiling level. Moreover, ten additional adults judged the perceptive 
similarity between each of the targets (2x18) and the corresponding taxonomic matching 
picture on a continuous scale from 0 to 20. A mean score of perceptual similarity between 0 
and 20 was calculated for each pair of targets.  No similarity difference between domains was 
observed (t = 0.78, p = .45). 
 
Results 
In session 1, taxonomic, thematic and irrelevant choices were coded for each child. 
Children whose responses did not differ significantly from chance (more than 4 irrelevant 
choices out of 20) were removed from the analysis. In session 2, correct responses for living 
and non-living items were recorded for each of the remaining children. Again, children whose 
responses did not differ significantly from chance (more than 3 irrelevant choices out of 18) in 
the second task were removed from the analysis. The final sample included 37 children. 
Session 1 
Following Dunham & Dunham (1995), a taxonomic bias was obtained. However, 
individual differences in the way children categorize objects were observed. Children made 
from 4 to 20 taxonomic choices (M = 14.5; SD = 4.1) and from 0 to 16 thematic choices (M = 
4.8; SD = 3.8). Individual measures of basic-level taxonomic and thematic choices were 
converted into Z-scores. Children were considered to have a greater basic-level taxonomic or 
thematic sensitivity compared to the sample bias when their taxonomic or thematic Z-score 
were above one. With this strict criterion, only 6 children showed a greater thematic 
sensitivity and 8 showed a greater taxonomic sensitivity.  
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Session 2 
A 2 (sensitivity: taxonomic, thematic) x 2 (domain: living things, non-living things) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the number of correct responses 
(superordinate taxonomic choices) made by the 14 children most sensitive to basic-level 
taxonomic or thematic relations. As predicted a main effect of domain was observed [F1(1,12) 
= 10.75; Mse = 1.10, p < .01]: living items (M = 5.83; SD = 1.77) received more correct 
responses than non-living items (M = 4.52; SD = 1.35). This effect remained marginally 
significant in the by-items analysis with perceptive similarity as covariate [F2(1,15) = 3.21; 
Mse = 582.98, p = .09]. A main effect of sensitivity was also noted (F(1,12) = 5.31; Mse = 
2.99, p< . 05): children most sensitive to taxonomic relations (M = 5.94; SD = 1.75) made 
more correct superordinate choices than children most sensitive to thematic relations (M = 
4.42; SD = 1.26). The interaction between preference and domain almost reached significance 
[F(1,12) = 4.12; Mse = 1.10, p = .06, see Figure 3]. Tukey post-hoc comparisons showed that 
children most sensitive to taxonomic relations revealed a significant advantage for living 
things. For children most sensitive to thematic relations, no difference between domains was 
obtained.  
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Figure 3 : Mean number of correct responses (+/- 1 SE) in session 2 as a function of sensitivity in session 1 
and domain 
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A similar tendency was expected on the entire sample. In order to check this additional 
hypothesis, correlations between the number of taxonomic choices in session 1 and the 
number of correct responses for living and non-living things in session 2 were calculated for 
the 37 children. As expected, taxonomic choices were positively linked to correct responses 
for living things (r = .38; p < .05), age (in months) partialled out. However, they were not 
linked to correct responses for non-living things (r = .005; p = .97). Moreover, no correlation 
between age in months and number of basic-level taxonomic or thematic choices in session 1 
was observed (respectively, r = -.003, p = .98; r = .15, p = .38).   
 
Discussion 
 The purpose of the present study was to examine preschooler’s individual differences 
in a matching task and to link these individual tendencies to superordinate categorization 
performances as a function of semantic domain. Results of session 1 – a matching task 
contrasting a thematic match and a basic-level taxonomic match – revealed that 3-year-old 
children’s sensitivity can be ordered on a taxonomic-thematic continuum, as reported by 
Dunham & Dunham (1995). Individual differences can therefore emerge in a match-to-sample 
task at this age when few constraints weigh on the situation (Lautrey, 2003) namely when 
instructions do not favour a particular response (“find the one which goes best with the target” 
in our experiment, “another one the same as the target” in Dunham and Dunham’s one). More 
specifically, some children exhibited a greater sensitivity for either taxonomic or thematic 
relations. In these situations, it is likely that both relations (e.g. dog-other dog and dog-bone) 
are activated but not necessarily with the same strength. A possibility is that children’s 
favorite way to deal with their environment during infancy reinforces one connection rather 
than the other. The role of children’s previous experience is highlighted by Dunham and 
Dunham (1995)’s longitudinal study. They observed positive correlations between matching 
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choices at 3 years and earlier gesture and language behaviour. They interpreted this feature as 
reflecting individual differences in children’s orientation towards objects. The greater 
sensitivity to basic-level taxonomic or thematic relations might also reflect a predominant use 
of integration or comparison as proposed by Wisniewski and Bassok (1999). The multiple 
feed-backs children receive from their environment during infancy (success, mother’s 
validation, etc.) certainly modulate the way they tend to process objects. In the matching task, 
this may influence the weighting of two co-activated associations and finally determine the 
child’s matching decision.  
Session 2 investigated children’s ability to categorize at the superordinate level 
according to children’s sensitivity in session 1 and concepts’ domain. Overall, superordinate 
taxonomic grouping of living things outperformed those of non-living things in accord with 
the hypothesis of an earlier organization of the living domain (Boyer et al., 2000; Gelman et 
al., 1998). The predicted interaction between children’s sensitivity and domain was almost 
significant (p=.06). This marginal effect seems meaningful since only 14 children were 
included in the Anova: the size of the sample has indeed reduced the statistical power of the 
test. We found that children most sensitive to taxonomic relations better categorized living 
things whereas performances of children most sensitive to thematic relations did not differ 
among domains.  These different patterns of performances as a function of basic-level 
taxonomic and thematic individual tendencies do not seem attributable to different 
developmental levels. First, neither the number of basic-level taxonomic choices nor the 
number of thematic choices in session 1 was correlated to children’s age.  Next, the global 
advantage of children most sensitive to basic-level taxonomic relations was not in the way 
predictable from developmental hypotheses since basic-level taxonomic concepts are 
supposed to precede thematic ones in development (Gelman et al., 1998).  Therefore, these 
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findings bring empirical evidence to a vision of concept formation involving at least 2 
processes more or less implicated according on individuals and situations. 
We suggest that children’s sensitivity to basic-level taxonomic/thematic relations, 
probably resulting from their own experience, may influence the kind of cues involved in 
concepts formation. A particular sensitivity to basic-level taxonomic relations might reflect a 
tendency to compare stimuli and favour the detection of common and distinctive properties. 
Quinn and Eimas (1996, 2000) have proposed that concepts could emerge by simply 
associating several kinds of knowledge with perceptual properties. Even 3 month-old children 
are indeed able to form basic-level categories (Quinn, Eimas, & Rosenkrantz, 1993) or 
superordinate categories (Behl-Chadha, 1996) on the basis of perceptual information. Hence, 
a developmental way originating in perceptual similarity relations should be particularly 
efficient for the formation of superordinate natural categories for which perceptual properties 
are central (Cree & McRae, 2003; Devlin et al., 1998; Farah & McClelland, 1991; Garrard et 
al., 2001; Laws et al., 1995; Sartori & Job, 1988). Our results clearly reveal the expected 
efficacy of the taxonomic tendency for natural objects since there was a) a living advantage in 
children most sensitive to taxonomic relations and b) a positive correlation between 
spontaneous taxonomic choices (session 1) and superordinate categorization in this domain. 
Additionally, we consider that a particular sensitivity to thematic relations between 
objects might reflect a tendency to integrate stimuli. This tendency may favor the access to 
contextualized categories (i.e., slot-fillers such as farm animals or breakfast food) which 
might derive from thematic relations. A similar developmental hypothesis has already been 
proposed by Nelson (1983; 1985) and more recently by Mandler (1992; 2000). Because 
contextual and functional information are central in the understanding of non-living things 
(Cree & McRae, 2003; Devlin et al., 1998; Farah & McClelland, 1991; Garrard et al., 2001; 
Laws et al., 1995; Sartori & Job, 1988), using contextual cues should be particularly efficient 
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for the formation of concepts of artefact concepts. However, our results did not show the 
expected “non-living” advantage in children most sensitive to thematic relations nor the 
negative correlation between taxonomic choices (session 1) and superordinate categorization 
for non-living items (session 2).  It is possible that children as young as 3 can not benefit from 
their greater sensitivity to thematic relations to form artefacts concepts. Indeed, a sufficient 
amount of experience is required for the integration of objects that share a contextual or a 
functional link. If this interpretation is correct, then older children (4-5 year-olds) most 
sensitive to thematic relations should better categorize artefacts at the superordinate level. 
Further studies are needed to test this hypothesis.  
Another way to explore the link between sensitivity to thematic or basic-level 
taxonomic relations and categorization performances at the superordinate level might consist 
in focusing on finer distinctions than the living/non-living dichotomy. The role of action in 
the understanding of many concepts of artifacts (Buccino et al., 2001; Chao & Martin, 2000; 
Creem-Regehr & Lee, 2005; Gerlach, Law, & Paulson, 2002; Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib, & 
Rizzolatti, 1997; Jonhnson-Frey, 2004; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003; Myung, 
Blumstein, & Sedivy, in press) have been emphasized. These findings suggest that 
manipulability / non manipulability which is often confounded with the living/non-living 
dichotomy (Filliter, McMullen, & Westwood, 2005) would better differentiate the way 
objects are processed. Integration and comparison processes could therefore be differentially 
activated according to object’s manipulability. Future research focusing on this dimension 
will allow to better specify the way children acquire knowledge about various kinds of 
objects. 
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Appendix 1: List of items used in session 1 
 
Target Basic level taxonomic choice Thematic choice Foil 
apple apple basket button 
castle castle knight bin 
carrot carrot rabbit shark 
barge boat oars rolling pin 
lion lion cub cage grapes  
lavatory sink soap monkey 
flower flower watering can ladle  
mouth  mouth  toothbrush belt 
shoe shoe foot ball corn 
fish fish fish bowl lemon 
axe axe joiner umbrella  
dog dog bone cactus  
hand fist pencil cloud  
bowl bowl slice of bread lamp  
pan pressure cooker potato frog 
squirrel squirrel hazelnut plant  
car car traffic lights bear  
hammer hammer nail caterpillar 
bird bird egg sock  
jacket jacket hanger cooker  
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Appendix 2: List of items used in session 2 
 
Target 1 Target 2 
Superordinate  
taxonomic choice Thematic choice Foil 
flower plant fir watering can camel 
jacket swimsuit T shirt hanger envelope 
mouth eye ear toothbrush ball 
hammer saw drill nail bee 
carrot tomato pumpkin rabbit jacket 
house  church hut door drum 
lion elephant swan cage cherry 
mitt pajamas shorts ski mushroom 
squirrel goat duck hazelnut feeding bottle 
plane lorry boat suitcase bottle 
fish monkey mouse fish bowl cactus 
apple banana grapes basket plug 
car train motor bike traffic lights caterpillar 
cooker desk sink pan cat 
hand foot leg pencil shark 
glass colander fork straw boot 
bird dolphin horse egg hat 
bed table cupboard pillow swing 
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